On April 19, 2013, there were three important amendments to the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rules of Criminal Procedure, and Rules of Evidence of which all practitioners in federal criminal cases must be aware. First, Fed. R. App. P 28 was amended so that parties are no longer required to include a separate “Statement of the Case” in their briefs. From time immemorial, the appellate rules required briefs to have a “Statement of the Case” chronicling the procedural posture of the case as well as a separate “Statement of the Facts.” After this recent amendment, however, Fed. R. App. P. 28 (a)(6) now requires only a “a concise statement of the case setting out the facts relevant to the issues submitted for review, describing the relevant procedural history, and identifying the rulings presented for review, with appropriate references to the record (see Rule 28(e)).” Consequently, briefs crafted in the federal circuit courts of appeals will mirror those filed in the Supreme Court, which jettisoned the “Statement of the Case” requirement long ago.
Second, during a guilty plea colloquy conducted under Fed. R. Crim. P. 11, district judges must notify all defendants that “if convicted, a defendant who is not a United States citizen may be removed from the United States, denied citizenship, and denied admission to the United States in the future.” This amendment is a reaction to the Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010).
Finally, Fed. R Evid. 803 was amended to allow the admission of a government official’s certification of the absence of a public record if the prosecution gives the defendant notice of its intention to introduce this certification at least 14 days before trial and the defendant does not lodge an objection within seven days before the trial begins. This amendment is in response to the Court’s decision in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, 557 U.S. 305 (2009). After the amendment, once the government gives the requisite notice, the rule will treat the defendant’s failure to object as a waiver of his right to confrontation that was vindicated in Melendez-Diaz.
